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COMMENT
The Controls on the Transfrontier
Movement of Hazardous Waste From
Developed to Developing Nations: The
Goal of a "Level Playing Field"
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the United States Congress began passing national en-
vironmental legislation. One reason for such legislation was to "level the
playing field" among the fifty states so that economic advantage did not
accrue to one state at the expense of environmental quality and public
health.' The world now faces a similar need for environmental legisla-
tion on an international level.
Environmental laws of individual nations have become more and
more divergent as developed countries, such as the United States, enact
tougher environmental laws, while less developed nations fail to enact
any environmental regulations. The variant standards of these environ-
mental laws have encouraged companies in industrialized nations to take
advantage of the developing countries' lax environmental regulations,
thereby enhancing their economic competitiveness at the cost of human
health and environmental quality in less developed nations.
This situation has resulted in a growing international trade in indus-
trial hazardous waste.2 As developed nations increasingly export hazard-
ous wastes to developing nations, the need for international
I Barnes, The Growing International Dimension to Environmental Issues, 13 COLUM. J. ENVT'L.
L. 389, 394 (1988).
2 "Hazardous waste" refers to the unused by-product of the industrial process resulting from
the manufacture of goods and services. It becomes necessary, however, to refer to the "legal" defini-
tion of hazardous waste in determining exactly which wastes are regulated under specific environ-
mental regulations. Such "legal" definitions are given throughout this Comment.
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environmental legislation which will "level the global playing field" be-
comes apparent.3
Part II of this Comment explains why occurrences of transfrontier
movements of hazardous waste are increasing and why this presents a
problem. Part III summarizes the United States' attempt to regulate the
export of hazardous waste and briefly summarizes two previous interna-
tional regulatory efforts to control the transfrontier flow of hazardous
waste. Part IV outlines and explains some of the major provisions of the
most recent international regulatory attempt to control transfrontier haz-
ardous waste movement, the United Nations Environment Programme
Convention ("UNEP Convention"). Part V of this Comment compares
the UNEP Convention with the growing call to ban all transfrontier
movement of hazardous waste. This section also discusses the ability of
the UNEP Convention and a ban on transfrontier hazardous waste
movement to provide a solution to the problems herein presented. This
Comment concludes that compliance with the UNEP Convention best
achieves the ultimate goal of a "level playing field."
II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
In the past, most transfrontier movement of hazardous waste oc-
curred between developed nations.4  Increasingly, however, the move-
ment is shifting toward less developed nations.5 The first of a number of
highly publicized events, involving the transfrontier movement of haz-
ardous waste to developing nations, came in 1980 when the President of
Sierra Leone rejected a twenty-five million dollar offer from Nedlog
3 The ultimate goal of a "level playing field" would be furthered if all nations adopted substan-
tially similar regulations governing hazardous waste disposal and had the ability to enforce such
laws. Thus, companies in industrialized nations would have little incentive to ship their waste to
developing countries or to open up manufacturing plants in these countries in order to avoid stricter
environmental regulations at home. In addition, companies located in countries which currently
have strict disposal laws would not suffer an economic disadvantage by complying with such laws.
Developing countries must also develop the information and technology necessary to handle hazard-
ous waste before the playing field will be truly level.
4 Traditionally, the United States has exported the majority of its toxic waste to Canada where
regulations are less stringent. Porterfield & Weir, The Export of U.S. Toxic Wastes, THE NATION,
Oct. 3, 1987, at 341. The United States signed a bilateral agreement with Canada in October 1986.
Under this agreement export of hazardous waste is allowed if no objection is heard within thirty days
of receipt of notification of the shipment. Rublack, Controlling Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Waste: The Evolution of a Global Convention, 13 THE FLETCHER FORUM 113, 116 (1989).
In addition to the bilateral agreement with Canada, the United States signed one with Mexico in
November 1986. Under this agreement only recyclable waste can legally be exported to Mexico, and
only with the explicit consent of the Mexican government. Id.
5 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 341. Although most transfrontier movement of hazard-
ous waste still occurs between industrialized nations, this paper focuses solely on movements from
developed to developing countries.
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Technologies Group, Inc., a Colorado Company, to ship hazardous
chemical wastes to his country for processing and disposal.6
Since 1986, United States and European companies have exported
waste to at least eleven developing nations,7 while several other nations
have been proposed as dumpsites.8 More than fifty plans to ship waste
from the United States and Europe to developing nations were recorded
from mid-1987 to mid-1988 alone.9 The trend toward using developing
nations as disposal sites appears to be a result of both the economic and
legal positions of the world's nations. 10
Developing nations have had little contact with industrial hazardous
wastes because they have few production facilities which generate
them.' 1 Thus, in the past it proved unnecessary for developing countries
to enact laws dealing with such wastes. 2 Contrarily, increased public
consciousness of the environment within industrialized nations has led to
the passage of stricter legislation regarding the disposal of hazardous
wastes. 13
As hazardous waste storage and disposal regulatory standards in the
United States and other industrialized nations become more stringent,
disposal sites become more scarce 14 and costs of compliance rose.' 5
6 Rublack, supra note 4, at 114.
7 These countries include Brazil, Guinea, Haiti, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Greenpeace Calls for World Ban on International Traffic in
Waste, 11 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 433 (Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Greenpeace Calls for World Ban].
For example, in March 1988, hazardous waste was left on the beaches of a Guinean resort island by
a Norwegian company. The waste was later discovered to be incinerator ash from the United States.
Nanda & Bailey, Export of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Technology: Challenges for Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 155, 157 (1988). In May 1988, an Italian
construction firm shipped 4,000 tons of toxic industrial waste to the port of Koko, Nigeria. The
cargo was stored in a vacant lot in a residential area for $100 a month. The Italian firm had applied
to import "non-explosive, non-radioactive and non-self-combusting" industrial chemicals. When the
scheme became public, fifteen people were arrested and Nigeria has since threatened execution for
anyone found importing toxic waste for profit. Id.
8 Greenpeace Calls for World Ban, supra note 7, at 433. Caribbean and Latin American coun-
tries rejecting waste include Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Martinique, Mexico, Netherland Antilles, Panama and Venezuela. Id. at
433-434.
9 Helmore, Dumping on Africa: West Exports Its Industrial Wastes, The Christian Science Mon-
itor, July 1, 1988, at 8, col. 1. It is likely that actual shipments were much greater since many
companies do not report plans to export hazardous waste.
10 See Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports A Leak in the System of International Legal Controls,
19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10171 (1989).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Nanda & Bailey, supra note 7, at 155.
14 For example, the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 gave facilities that handle
hazardous waste until November 8, 1985 to apply for a final permit (certifying that they were in
compliance with certain interim requirements). By April 1986, the Environmental Protection
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Companies generating such wastes thus face rising manufacturing costs
resulting from the need to comply with increasingly tougher disposal
laws. 16 As a result of high compliance costs, 17 companies located in de-
veloped nations find it increasingly difficult to compete in the world
market.
When the cost of exportation and disposal of hazardous waste in a
foreign location is lower than the cost of disposal at home, companies
will export their hazardous waste." A company's exportation of hazard-
ous waste to developing nations often drastically reduces disposal costs
and thus enhances competitiveness on both a national and international
level.' 9 As the legal and technical standards of disposal rise, and as lia-
bility costs in industrialized nations increase, more and more companies
will likely seek the more economical choice to export their waste to de-
veloping countries.
On the other side, developing nations see toxic waste trade as a
source of much needed revenue.20 For example, although the agreement
was aborted, if Guinea-Bissau had accepted toxic wastes from the United
States company Lindaco, Guinea-Bissau would have received $120 mil-
lion a year, an amount close to its gross national product.2 1 Thus, the
business of hazardous waste import is considered to have great financial
Agency's Office of Waste Programs Enforcement reported that two-thirds of land disposal facilities
had lost their interim status. Thus, even though most of these facilities remained in operation to
dispose of non-hazardous wastes, the number of facilities handling hazardous waste declined greatly.
International Export of U.S. Waste: Hearing Before A Subcommittee of the Committee of Government
Operations House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19 (1988) [hereinafter International
Export Hearing].
15 Average toxic disposal costs in United States' landfills rose from $15 a ton in 1980 to $250 a
ton in 1988. Brooke, African Nations Barring Foreign Toxic Waste, The New York Times, Sept. 25,
1988, at 18, col. 1. Disposal is more costly not only because disposal sites are scarce, but also
because the regulations are harder to meet. For example, many hazardous wastes that could have
been disposed of in landfills in the past are now required to be destroyed by incineration. ORGANI-
ZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFRONTIER MOVEMENTS OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES 8 (1985) [hereinafter OECD].
16 Id.
17 For example, incinerator ash can cost upwards of $1,000 a ton to dispose of in the United
States. Incineration of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) can cost up to $2,000 a ton in Western
Europe. Ertugrul, EC Faces Uphill Struggle To Clean Up Toxic Waste Exports, The Reuter Library
Report, Aug. 4, 1988.
18 OECD, supra note 15, at 8. Cost includes such factors as time and potential liability. Many
companies, now operating exclusively as transporters of hazardous waste, have reaped substantial
profits by helping other companies reduce such cost factors.
19 It has been estimated that dumping in developing nations results in savings of approximately
seventy-five dollars a ton. Id. at 9. This figure does not include the additional savings from possible
avoidance of Superfund liability.
20 Millman, Exporting Hazardous Waste; From Developed to Third World Nations, 92 TECH.
REV. 6 (1989).
21 Id.
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potential.22 Unfortunately, this need for scarce revenue leads to bargain-
basement contracts whereby developing countries agree to import haz-
ardous waste at prices drastically below those the exporting companies
would have experienced for disposal at home.23
Economically this seems an ideal market situation. Companies in
developed countries enter the hazardous waste market to buy waste dis-
posal services, while developing countries enter the market to sell such
services. Under the economic model, the market should dictate the price
received and all parties should be happy with the resultant transaction.
Several problems arise from such transactions.
Unlike the economic model that assumes perfect information, devel-
oping countries accept hazardous waste shipments with little understand-
ing of the health and environmental dangers such wastes present.24
Current United States regulations are structured in a manner which al-
lows companies to avoid providing complete information regarding the
wastes they export.25 In addition, developing countries may not know
what wastes they receive due to mislabeling and the deliberate mixing of
harmless material with hazardous waste.26 For example, hazardous sub-
stances have been misrepresented as cleaning fluid, fertilizer and con-
struction material.27 Thus, even if developing countries have a full
understanding of the problems of hazardous waste disposal, they often
cannot be sure of which wastes they receive and will therefore be unable
to treat them in an environmentally-safe manner.
To complicate matters further, in almost 100% of the cases, devel-
oping nations do not possess adequate facilities to properly dispose of
much of the hazardous waste they receive.28 United Nations experts
know of no developing country which possesses an incinerator capable of
safely destroying hazardous waste.29 Almost all developing countries
22 Hiltzik, West's Waste Dumping Stirs African Controversy, Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1988,
at 9, col. 1.
23 Id.
24 Schierholz, U.S. Resists Limits on International Toxic Wastes Trade, The Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 7, 1988, at 8.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 54-64.
26 The Global Poison Trade, Newsweek, Nov. 7, 1988, at 67.
27 In 1985, two Americans were jailed in the United States for exporting toxic waste to
Zimbabwe. These wastes were labeled as cleaning fluid. Helmore, supra note 9, at 8, col 1. A ship,
the Khian Sea, unloaded 3,000 tons of incinerator ash labeled as fertilizer on a beach in Haiti and
incinerator ash left on Guinea's Kassa Island was labeled as construction material. Greenpeace Calls
for World Ban, supra note 7, at 433.
28 Ertugrul, supra note 17.
29 Bollag, Developing Countries Win Support for Curbs On Toxic Dumping, The New York
Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at C4, col. 2.
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dispose of such wastes in landfills.3 0 Experts have concluded that land-
fills can never provide a safe means of hazardous waste disposal because
the heavy metals and other toxic materials contained in them will eventu-
ally dissolve and wash out.31 Additionally, developing countries do not
possess adequate administrative structures to control the risks of hazard-
ous waste disposal.32 Corrupt officials are often paid off by exporters
seeking a cheap and easy means of disposal for their hazardous waste.33
Several contracts between United States and European companies and
African governments contained kickbacks to the officials who approved
them. 34
Thus, the public health and environmental quality in developing na-
tions are being sacrificed so that companies in developed nations can
maintain economic competitiveness or gain an economic advantage over
their competitors in both domestic and foreign markets. The problem, as
explained, has its basis in the economic underpinnings of the world econ-
omy and in the industrial, political and legal development (or lack of
development) of the world's nations. It thus seems logical that an ade-
quate solution to the hazardous waste problem must address these issues.
III. EFFORTS TO CONTROL WASTE DISPOSAL
The realization that the export of hazardous wastes to developing
nations presents a serious problem is not a new one. Both individual
countries and international organizations have made several attempts to
control the transfrontier movement of hazardous waste. Unfortunately,
these efforts have failed to protect the interests of developing nations be-
cause they are neither fully implemented nor adequately enforced. Fur-
ther, such regulations do not address the reasons companies in
industrialized countries export such wastes. Thus, such efforts have
failed to provide a "level playing field" in the world of hazardous waste
disposal.
A. United States Regulation
In the United States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act3 5 ("RCRA") governs the entire hazardous waste cycle from produc-
tion to disposal and exists as the main regulatory scheme dealing with
30 Bollag, Hazardous Waste is a Foreign Matter, Chemical Week, Dec. 7, 1988, at 45.
31 Bollag, supra note 29, at C4, col. 2.
32 Rublack, supra note 4, at 115.
33 International Export Hearing, supra note 14, at 9.
34 Nanda & Bailey, supra note 7, at 157.
35 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
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hazardous waste.36 Initially, RCRA contained no provisions which dealt
with exporting hazardous waste outside of the United States.37 In No-
vember 1984, Congress adopted the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments of 1984 ("HSWA").38 Under HSWA, export of hazardous waste is
prohibited unless the exporter notifies the EPA Administrator of its in-
tent to export,39 and the receiving country's government consents to ac-
cept such waste.40
The EPA, in conjunction with the Department of State, is in charge
of transmitting notification of the impending export to the receiving
country's government within thirty days of receipt of notice of the pro-
posed shipment from the exporter.41 Notification must include a descrip-
tion of the United States' regulations which apply to the treatment,
storage and disposal of the hazardous wastes to be exported.42 The EPA
also requires notice to be sent to all transit countries, but does not require
their consent.43
In addition to notification of intent to export, companies are re-
quired to file annual reports with the EPA summarizing the types, quan-
tities, frequency and ultimate destination of all hazardous wastes
36 Comment, Transboundary Waste Dumping: The United States and Mexico Take a Stand, 27
NAT. RESOURCES J. 941, 942 (1987) [hereinafter Transboundary Waste Dumping].
37 Id. at 944.
38 Codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C. Prior to adopting HSWA, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency in 1980, promulgated regulations placing requirements on generators and transport-
ers regarding the export of hazardous wastes. Generators were required to notify the EPA prior to
shipment to a foreign country. These regulations, however, did not require reporting quantity, fre-
quency of shipment, manner of transportation or treatment. Comment, U.S. Controls on Interna-
tional Disposal of Hazardous Waste, 22 INT'L LAW. 775, 779 (1988) [hereinafter U.S. Controls].
39 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. V 1988). The notification must include: (1) the primary exporter;,
and (2) a description of, (i) the waste, (ii) the estimated frequency of export, (iii) the estimated
total quantity of such waste, (iv) all points of entry to and departure from each foreign country
through which the waste will pass, (v) the means of transportation, (vi) the manner in which the
hazardous waste will be treated, stored, or disposed of in the receiving country, (vii) the name and
address of the ultimate treatment, storage or disposal facility, and (viii) the name of any transit
country through which the hazardous waste will be sent. 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(a)-(b) (1989).
40 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (1989). In addition, a copy of the consent must be attached to the mani-
fest which accompanies the waste shipment and the shipment must conform to the terms of the
consent. Id. In March 1986, the EPA proposed new regulations governing the exportation of haz-
ardous wastes to conform to the statutory language set out in HSWA. 51 Fed. Reg. 8744 (1986); 40
C.F.R. § 262 (1989).
41 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(e) (1989). Thus, companies have little control over the process and could
face delays depending on how quickly the State Department acts.
42 42 U.S.C. § 6938(dX4) (1989). The intention is to give the importing company information
regarding what would constitute "proper" disposal. It is unclear, however, whether developing
countries can weigh the differences between United States disposal methods and those it intends to
use. There is no provision which requires the United States to provide technical assistance.
43 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(e) (1989); See also Response to Comments, 51 Fed. Reg. 28667 (1986).
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exported during the previous year." Every other year, the reports must
include a description of the companies' efforts to reduce the volume and
toxicity of the waste they generate.4"
HSWA regulates all hazardous wastes that may "cause, or signifi-
cantly contribute to an increase in mortality or... serious... illness...
or... pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or
the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or dis-
posed of, or otherwise managed. ' '4 6 The EPA promulgated detailed reg-
ulations listing waste characteristics and chemicals that are to be treated
as hazardous.4 7 HSWA does not require notice and consent for wastes
which the United States does not regulate as hazardous wastes. Thus,
even if an importing country defines a waste as hazardous or such waste
has potential harmful effects if not disposed of properly, such waste is not
regulated under HSWA unless the United States defines it as
hazardous.48
Although RCRA provides a number of liability provisions, these
provisions are of little use once the hazardous wastes leave the United
States. 49 Courts generally require a clear legislative intent before a do-
mestic law is deemed to have extraterritorial effect.5" RCRA does not
manifest such a clear intent.5 1 It thus appears that citizens of a foreign
country have no standing to invoke RCRA and are thus powerless to
make United States corporations accountable under United States law
for their hazardous waste disposal activities outside of the United
States.5 2
It was the legislative intent in passing HSWA for the EPA and the
United States Customs Service to work together to establish "an effective
program to monitor and spot check international shipment of hazardous
waste to assure compliance with the requirements of [RCRA]." 5 3 This
44 40 C.F.R. § 262.56 (1989).
45 Id. at § 262.56(a)(5)(i). However, it appears that no penalties are imposed on companies
which fal to reduce the quantity or toxicity of their waste by-products. This provision seems to be
the only way in which the United States' regulations encourage waste reduction.
46 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
47 Handley, supra note 10, at 10174. The characteristics of hazardous waste are ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity, and extra procedure toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3 and 261.20-24 (1989). The
types of waste which are hazardous, as well as hazardous constituents are listed at 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.30-33 (1989).
48 Response to Comments, 51 Fed. Reg. 28670 (1986). The EPA felt that a dual system, one for
export and one for domestic shipment was unwarranted under the existing law. Id.
49 Handley, supra note 10, at 10174.
50 See Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
51 Handley, supra note 10, at 10174.
52 Id.
53 S. Rep. No. 98-284, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 48 (1983).
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has proven to be a difficult task.
There is strong evidence that many shipments are never reported to
the EPA. 4 Estimates indicate that waste exports are as much as eight
times greater than that reported.55 Some exporters who filed annual re-
ports, but failed to give notice and obtain consent, claimed ignorance of
the regulations.5 6 Many other exporters did not bother to notify the
EPA because "there isn't any enforcement."57 United States government
agencies that are given the task of regulating shipments of hazardous
waste say they lack the money and the personnel to do the job properly.58
Unless companies properly fie notification and the receiving country's
consent is obtained, no assurance exists that the receiving country would
agree to accept the wastes being exported to them. 9 Furthermore, un-
less the receiving country's government is aware of the hazardous waste
imports it will be unable to control potential harm to the public or the
environment.
Another criticism of current HSWA regulations is that United
States government officials are powerless to stop even the most dangerous
waste exports if the host country agrees to accept them.' Unless the
receiving country has enacted its own controls, there may be no regula-
tion of disposal once the waste leaves the United States.6" United States
regulations do not require any inspection or follow-up to assure that
wastes are properly disposed of abroad.62 Further, the EPA provides the
importing country neither "conclusions regarding the adequacy of the
exporter's proposals, nor a recommendation on whether the proposal
should be accepted."
63
While the HSWA notice and consent provisions are designed to give
the importing countries an opportunity to refuse waste they cannot or do
not wish to dispose of, their effectiveness is questionable given the ambig-
54 Comparing Customs Service records at several United States ports with the notices sent to the
EPA, EPA auditors detected many more shipments than were reported. EPA, Program to Control
Exports of Hazardous Waste, Audit Report No. E1D37-05-0456-80855, at 14 (March 1988) [herein-
after EPA Audit].
55 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 341.
56 EPA Audit, supra note 54, at 15.
57 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 341.
58 Id. Hazardous waste exports are not adequately controlled, stemming in part from a lack of
attention, resources, and communication between responsible agencies. EPA's Program on Hazard-
ous Waste Exports Needs Improvements, Inspector General Says, 11 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 434
(Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter EPA's Program].
59 International Export Hearing, supra note 14, at 13.
60 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 343.
61 Handley, supra note 10, at 10172 n.22.
62 Id.
63 International Export Hearing, supra note 14, at 2.
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uous regulations which govern the planned disposal and the difficulty
EPA has in enforcing its provisions.6 Numerous reforms are necessary
before HSWA begins to fulfill its legislative purpose.
B. International Regulations
1. European Community Directive on the Supervision and Control
Within the European Community of the Transfrontier
Shipment of Hazardous Waste.
On December 6, 1984, The European Community ("EC") Council
adopted the Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the Euro-
pean Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Wastes
("EC Directive"). 65 The EC Directive establishes a notice and authori-
zation system for the transfrontier movement of hazardous waste involv-
ing EC member states."
The EC Directive defines hazardous waste as any waste containing
or contaminated by certain substances listed in the EC Directive, which
occur in such quantities or concentrations as to constitute a risk to
human health or the environment.67 Unlike United States law,68 the EC
Directive requires exporters to obtain consent whenever the importing or
transit country defines the waste as hazardous.69
Under the EC Directive, notice must contain information on the
source and composition of the waste, the provisions made for routes and
64 Handley, supra note 10, at 10175.
65 Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European Community of the Transfrontier
Shipment of Hazardous Waste, (84/631/EEC), 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 326) 31 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter EC Directive].
66 Handley, supra note 10, at 10175. The EC member states include; Belgium, Denmark,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and
West Germany. The EC has the power to legislate through directives which require member states
to assure that the objectives and procedures defined in the directives are implemented and fully
incorporated into their national laws. Id. at 10176. Member states are bound to take all necessary
steps to assure compliance with the directives. Id. at 10175, n.71. Uniformity of laws, however, is
not required when the directives are not specific. Id. at 10176. The European Court of Justice has
the authority to enforce measures enacted by the council and may void legislation of member states
which conflict with EC laws. Id. at 10176 n.102.
67 EC Directive, supra note 65, at art 2(IXa). The EC Directive adopted this definition from the
Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 84) at art. 2(1)(a) (1978)
(Directive 78/319/EEC). Under this definition there is a lack of uniformity among EC member
states because each state is left to define the specific quantities or concentrations that constitute such
risks. Id. With no uniformity it is difficult for an exporting company to determine whether or not it
must obtain approval before shipment.
68 The United States does not take into account the definitions of other countries in determining
which wastes are hazardous. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
69 Handley, supra note 10, at 10177.
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insurance against damage to third parties,70 the measures to be taken to
assure safe transit and compliance with any conditions established by
member states involved, and evidence of a contractual agreement with
the party to whom the waste is being shipped for disposal.7 1 The con-
signee should have adequate technical capacity for disposal of the waste
without causing danger to human health or the environment and must
have a permit for storage, treatment or disposal.72 A transfrontier ship-
ment may not occur before a member acknowledges receipt of the
notification.7a
The EC Directive also requires prior notice to nonmember states to
whom waste is exported.74 Further, a 1986 amendment requires the con-
sent of any nonmember state to whom or through which hazardous
waste is exported. 5 Countries may object to such shipments "on the
basis of laws and regulations relating to environmental protection, safety
and public policy or health protection .... 76
While the EC Directive appears to be a step toward "leveling the
playing field" in the area of hazardous waste transport regulations, in
reality this has not occurred. Many countries have "blatantly ignored"
the EC Directive on the export of hazardous waste.77 Even countries
which enacted legislation have failed to provide adequate enforcement
provisions. 71 Accordingly, because member states have not fully imple-
mented the EC Directive, it has had no practical effect.79
70 The Directive does not require that exporters have insurance, only that information as to
insurance be provided. EC Directive, supra note 65, at art 3(3).
71 Id.
72 Id. The EC Directive thus appears to be more concerned with what happens to hazardous
wastes once they leave the exporting country than do the United States regulation.
73 Id. at art. 4(1).
74 Id. at art. 3(4). Such notice is to be the same as that provided to member states. Handley,
supra note 10, at 10175 n.82.
75 Council Directive Amending Directive 84/631/EEC on the Supervision and Control Within
the European Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste (86/279/EEC) 29
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 181) 13 at art. 3(4) (1986).
76 EC Directive, supra note 65, at art. 4(3).
77 EC Rules on Waste Exports Often Ignored; Ministries Disagree on Tightening Standards, 11
Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 375 (July 13,1988). In fact, only Belgium, Greece, Denmark and Luxem-
bourg have implemented the Directive. Greenpeace Prompted by Vulcans II, Seeks Waste Shipment
Directive Enforcement, 11 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 526, 527 (Oct. 1988).
78 Handley, supra note 10, at 10177.
79 Id.
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2. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Decision
and Recommendation on Transfrontier Movements of
Hazardous Waste.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD")8" Decision and Recommendation on Transfrontier Move-
ments of Hazardous Waste ("OECD Decision")" l constituted the first
legally binding international instrument aimed at improving the control
of transfrontier movements of hazardous waste.8 2
A 1986 OECD Export Decision 3 requires member countries to en-
sure that their officials have the authority to prohibit exports in appropri-
ate instances, apply no less strict controls on nonmember countries than
on member countries, prohibit movements of hazardous wastes to a non-
member country without consent and prior notification, 4 and prohibit
movements to nonmember countries unless the wastes are directed to an
adequate disposal facility in that country. 5
The OECD Decision defines hazardous waste broadly as "any waste
... considered as hazardous or legally defined as hazardous in the coun-
try where it is situated or through or to which it is conveyed .... .""
Thus, the OECD definition of hazardous waste requires exporters to ob-
tain consent whenever the importing or transit country defines the waste
as hazardous.
8 7
Although the OECD Decision and Recommendation does not deal
directly with the issue of liability, it recommends that countries attempt
to ensure that "the transport and disposal of its waste be undertaken in
80 The OECD members include; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
81 Decision and Recommendation on Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, OECD
Document (83) 180 (final) reproduced at 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984) [hereinafter Decision and Recommen-
dation]. The OECD Decision was adopted February 1, 1984.
82 Rublack, supra note 4, at 120.
83 Council Decision-Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes From the OECD Area,
OECD Doc. (86) 64 (final, reproduced at 25 I.L.M. 1010 (1986) [hereinafter Council Decision].
84 Companies must provide the exporting, importing and transit countries with adequate and
timely information specifying the origin, nature, composition and quantities of the waste intended
for export, the conditions of carriage, the nature of the environmental risks involved, the type of
disposal and the identity of all entities concerned. Decision and Recommendation, supra note 81, at
216.
85 Council Decision, supra note 83, at 1011. This final provision makes transfrontier shipments
to developing countries extremely unlikely.
86 Decision and Recommendation, supra note 81, at 217.
87 Since the United States does not utilize the definitions of other countries in determining
whether its provisions apply, this definitional problem has become a major point of contention and
has limited further agreement among OECD countries. Handley, supra note 10, at 10178.
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accordance with the laws and regulations applicable in the countries con-
cerned."8 a Often the importing country does not have laws or regula-
tions governing hazardous waste disposal, thereby rendering this
provision meaningless.
The OECD Decision binds member states, but the recommenda-
tions for carrying out the decision do not. 9 No time limit was estab-
lished for the implementation of the OECD Decision and no provision
was made for any penalty in the event such period is excessive.90 Many
OECD member countries will have to pass new legislation or introduce
new regulations to enable their authorities to implement the OECD De-
cision and to force certain individuals to provide the authorities with spe-
cific information.91 Thus, the OECD Decision, like the EC Directive, is
unlikely to become an effective tool in the regulation of transfrontier
shipments of hazardous waste.
Clearly, international legislation goes further in creating a "level
playing field" than do individual countries' efforts to regulate trans-
frontier hazardous waste shipments. When the same regulations apply to
companies in several countries, companies in any one country do not face
tougher disposal laws than their competitors abroad and those compa-
nies have less incentive to export their waste. Additionally, if the coun-
try to which a company intends to export its hazardous waste adopts
disposal laws similar to the exporting country's disposal laws, much of
the incentive to export would be lost. However, unimplemented or unen-
forced international legislation proves as good as no legislation. Further,
as long as some countries continue to carry lax environmental legislation,
companies will find ways to dispose of their hazardous waste in those
countries.
IV. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME'S BASEL
CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND
THEIR DISPOSAL
The United Nations is the largest international organization that
could regulate the transfrontier movement of hazardous waste.92 In 1987
88 Decision and Recommendation, supra note 81, at General Principles, para. 3(a) at 216.
89 Handley, supra note 10, at 10178.
90 Smets, Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes: An Examination of the Council Deci-
sions and Recommendations, 14 ENVT'L POL'Y & L. 16 (1985).
91 Id.
92 Comment, Issues and Policy Considerations Regarding Hazardous Waste Exports, 11 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 373, 383 (1989) [hereinafter Issues and Policy Considerations]. Article 55 of the United
Nations Charter requires member nations to promote "solutions of international economic, social,
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the United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") adopted the fi-
nal Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound
Management of Hazardous Wastes. 93 The Cairo Guidelines cover the
management of hazardous wastes from "cradle to grave.",9 4 Such guide-
lines, however, are not legally binding. Because these guidelines do not
legally bind member countries and in response to growing demands from
developing countries following recent publicity surrounding hazardous
waste exports, 9" the UNEP sponsored a working group of legal and tech-
nical experts to prepare a global convention on the control of the trans-
frontier movements of hazardous wastes.96
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal97 ("UNEP Convention") was
signed, after eighteen months of negotiations, by thirty-five of 116 coun-
tries participating in the March 20-22, 1989 negotiations in Basel, Swit-
zerland.9" Developing countries comprised at least half of the
signatories. 99 Due to the number of countries involved in the UNEP
Convention it has the potential of becoming the most binding interna-
tional provision regulating the transfrontier movement of hazardous
waste. It is also the most restrictive regulation to date. The UNEP Con-
vention will enter into effect as soon as it is ratified by twenty coun-
tries."°° While forty-six countries have signed the UNEP Convention,
including the United States which signed on March 21, 1990,101 only
health, and related problems." U.N. Charter, art. 55 at para. 1. The United Nations Environment
Programme ('UNEP") was created by the 1972 Stockholm Conference. Sohn, The Stockholm Dec-
laration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV INT'L L.J. 423 (1973). Principle 21 of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment states that
"States have... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion." Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/
14, at 2-65, and Corr. I (1972). Together, Article 55 and Principle 21 provide the mandate for the
UNEP to promote an international agreement on the transfrontier movement of hazardous waste.
Issues and Policy Considerations, at 384.
93 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex 11 (1987).
94 Rublack, supra note 4, at 118.
95 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
96 U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/30, (1987).
97 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, UNEP Doc. I.G.80/3 reproduced at 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter UNEP Convention].
98 Legislation on Global Waste Control to be Proposed by Year's End to Congress, The Bureau of
'National Affairs, Inc., Daily Report for Executives, Aug. 22, 1989, DER No. 161.
99 Id. The UNEP is the only international organization involved in regulating the transfrontier
flow of hazardous waste in which developing countries participated.
100 United States Signs Convention to Prohibit Certain Waste Exports, The Bureau of National
Affairs, Daily Report for Executives, March 22, 1990, DER No. 56.
101 Id.
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three nations have ratified the convention."°
A. Negotiation Problems
Reaching a consensus on the UNEP Convention proved to be a diffi-
cult task. Several issues threatened to halt the convening of the sched-
uled March, 1989 conference. The lack of agreement often resulted from
differing priorities of industrialized and developing nations.
One of the most difficult issues to resolve was how to define "haz-
ardous waste." Many nations do not draw a distinction between wastes
such as ordinary garbage, incinerator ash and hazardous waste."0 3 Other
nations have highly detailed lists of wastes which they consider hazard-
ous.104 In addition, some countries such as the United States do not
want different regulations governing foreign and domestic disposal. 0 5
The more divergence between international regulations and national
laws, the more difficult it becomes for companies to comply with such
regulations. This divergence also makes it more difficult for nations to
ratify the UNEP Convention because it entails changing their domestic
legislation in order to comply with the Convention's provisions.
Another debate arose over the perceived need for an international
secretariat with powers to police compliance with the UNEP Conven-
tion. It was understood that developing countries did not want an inter-
national group of inspectors checking their landfill operations. 106
However, widespread support existed for the creation of a secretariat to
coordinate international assistance for developing countries.10 7 The sec-
retariat's duties would include transfers of technology, organizing inter-
national intervention in case of an accident, and monitoring worldwide
waste movements in order to prevent illegal shipments. 108 In addition,
many developing countries supported a provision requiring that the sec-
retariat be notified before a waste shipment takes place. ' 9 The United
States, however, objected to giving the secretariat such responsibility be-
102 Planet-Saving Report Card, Time, April 23, 1990, at 83.
103 International Export Hearing, supra note 14, at 1.
104 Because most waste is exported from countries having a more inclusive definition of hazard-
ous waste it would appear that using the exporter's legal definition of hazardous waste would ade-
quately regulate the types of wastes being shipped. Rublack, supra note 4, at 122. This is not the
case, however, when the exporting country excludes materials from its hazardous waste definition
which the importing country cannot adequately dispose of given its waste control system. Id.
105 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
106 Waste Shipment Incidents Spur Interest in UNEP Agreement to Deal With Problem, 11 Int'l
Envt. Rep. (BNA) 471 (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter Waste Shipment Incidents].
107 Bollag, supra note 29, at C4, col. 4-5.
108 Id. at C4, col. 5.
109 Id.
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cause of the enormous amount of paperwork which it felt would create
an inefficient use of the secretariat's time. 10
One of the main problems concerning developing countries was
their lack of expertise in waste management techniques.'11 It was thus
generally believed that they would not agree to the signature of the
UNEP convention without some provision for technology transfer to aid
them in the development of this field.112 Difficulty arose over the appro-
priate type and extent of any accompanying technology transfers.
The extent of prior notification required for transit countries was
another area of sharp contention. Developing countries wanted the right
to refuse transit of hazardous wastes across their territory unless they
give prior informed consent.113 Developed nations did not agree with
such a provision because they feared that developing countries lacked the
infrastructure to handle the necessary paperwork, thereby complicating
the possibility of such shipments going through.114 Developed nations
wanted a flexible framework enabling movement to take place after due
notification was given.I 5 Developing countries, however, wanted the
Convention set up so that if the transit country did not respond within
the prescribed time limit, the exporter would understand that the transit
country objected to the shipment.1 16
B. The Final Convention
L General Structure and Scope
Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba of Egypt, the Executive Director of the
UNEP, stated that the aim of the UNEP Convention is "a major reduc-
tion in the generation of hazardous wastes." '117 This goal is to be met by
making transfrontier movement "so costly and difficult that industry will
find it more profitable to cut down on waste production and re-use [and]
110 Id. at C4, col. 5-6.
111 UNEP Transboundary Transport Draft Bogged Down Over Prior-Consent Issue, 11 Int'l Envt.
Rep. (BNA) 660 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter UNEP Transboundary Transport Draft].
112 Id.
113 Id. In other words, transit countries wanted the same right to refuse shipment as importing
countries would have.
114 Id.
115 Id. The United States stated that a transit country should have a certain period of time, say
fifteen days, to object to a shipment passing through it. If nothing is heard within this time the
shipment could go ahead, but if shipment were refused then the exporting country would have to
find another route. Developed, Developing Countries Disagree Over Elements of Waste Shipment
Agreement, 11 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 376 (July 13, 1988) [hereinafter Developed, Developing Coun-
tries Disagree].
116 Id.
117 Bollag, supra note 30, at 45.
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recycle what waste they produce."11 The UNEP Convention assumes
that the reduction of hazardous waste generation to a minimum in terms
of quantity and/or hazard potential is the most effective means of pro-
tecting human health and the environment. 119 Although the UNEP
Convention does not ban the transfrontier movement of hazardous
wastes as many would like, it does recognize the increasing desire for the
prohibition on transfrontier movement of such waste, especially to devel-
oping countries. 120
In attempting to meet these goals, the UNEP Convention requires
that parties take all practical steps to ensure that the transfrontier move-
ment of hazardous wastes "is conducted in a manner which will protect
human health and the environment against the adverse effects which may
result from such movements ..... ", Specifically, the UNEP Conven-
tion requires parties to "[e]nsure that the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes is reduced to the minimum consistent with the envi-
ronmentally sound and efficient management of such wastes.. ,.122 and
that each party "[n]ot allow the export of hazardous wastes... if it has
reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in an
environmentally sound manner. '
2. Discussion and Analysis of Specific Provisions
a. Types of Shipment and Waste Covered
The UNEP Convention applies to all methods of shipping hazard-
ous waste; road, rail, sea, air and inland waters.' 24 The scope of the
UNEP Convention applies to a specific list of controlled waste catego-
ries125 and to hazardous wastes considered or defined as hazardous by
the domestic legislation of the party of import, export or transit. 126 Each
party to the UNEP Convention is to inform the Secretariat, within six
118 Legislation on Global Waste Control to be Proposed by Year's End to Congress, supra note 98,
at DER No 161.
119 UNEP Convention, supra note 97, at Preamble. This provision recognizes that a reduction in
quantity does not always represent a reduction in hazard potential.
120 Id.
121 Id. at art. 4(2)(d).
122 Id.
123 Id. at art. 4(2)(e).
124 Id. at Annex V A(11).
125 Id. at art. I(1)(a). These categories include certain waste streams and wastes that have certain
constituents, unless these wastes do not possess any of the characteristics contained in Annex III.
See id. at Annex I and III. In addition to hazardous wastes, the UNEP Convention regulates "other
wastes" Id. at art. 1(2). Other wastes include wastes collected from households and residues arising
from incineration of household wastes. See id. at Annex II.
126 Id. at art. l(l)(b). Thus, the convention's definition of hazardous waste is fairly inclusive and
covers much more than any of the prior international regulations.
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months of becoming a party, of the wastes considered or defined as haz-
ardous under its national legislation,127 and is to inform the Secretariat of
any significant changes to the information it has provided. 2 ' Each party
thus has the discretion to define hazardous waste as it desires. The regu-
lated waste, however, must be "legally" hazardous in that state. Coun-
tries, therefore, may not declare wastes "hazardous" on a case by case
basis.
This definition of hazardous waste addresses situations where the
exporting country does not define the waste as hazardous, although the
waste may be harmful if not disposed of properly. If a receiving country
legally declares a waste hazardous it could prohibit the importation of
the waste under the UNEP Convention, even though the exporting coun-
try does not define such waste as hazardous. Thus, the UNEP Conven-
tion does not require a uniform definition of hazardous waste. As long as
either the exporting, importing or transit party considers the waste haz-
ardous, the waste is a "hazardous waste" for the entire purpose of the
UNEP Convention.' 29 This resolves the definitional problem, but makes
the transfrontier movement of hazardous wastes more complex.
130
b. Notification Provisions
The UNEP Convention requires the state of export to notify, or re-
quire the generator 131 or exporter 132 to notify, in writing, the competent
authority of the states concerned (including states of export, import and
transit) of any proposed transboundary movement of hazardous wastes
or other wastes. 13  The state of export may thus choose to notify the
127 Id. at art. 3(1).
128 Id. at art. 3(2).
129 Id. at art. 1(1).
130 Rather than having a single definition of hazardous waste, there could now be as many differ-
ent definitions as there are parties to the Convention, each which must be checked with regard to any
countries of import or transit whenever a party intends to export hazardous waste.
131 "'Generator' means any person whose activity produces hazardous wastes or other wastes or,
if that person is not known, the person who is in possession and/or control of those wastes." Id. at
art. 2(18).
132 " 'Exporter' means any person under the jurisdiction of the State of export who arranges for
hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported." Id. at art. 2(15).
133 Id. at art. 6(l). The notification is to include the following detailed information: (1) reason
for waste export; (2) exporter of the waste; (3) generator(s) of the waste and site of generation;
(4) disposer of the waste and actual site of disposal; (5) intended carrier(s) of the waste if known;
(6) country of export of the waste; (7) expected countries of transit; (8) country of import of the
waste; (9) general or single notification; (10) projected date(s) of shipment(s) and period of time
over which waste is to be exported and proposed itinerary (including point of entry and exit);
(11) means of transport envisaged (road, rail, sea, air, inland waters); (12) information relating to
insurance; (13) designation and physical description of the waste and its composition and informa-
tion on any special handling requirements including emergency provisions in case of accidents;
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competent authority of the states concerned or may allow the waste gen-
erator or exporter, most likely the company who seeks to export the
waste, to deal directly with the states of import and transit.
If individual companies are left to perform the notification, they will
retain more control and will be less likely to face bureaucratic delays.
However, it appears that the exporter would have to determine whether
the waste it seeks to export falls within the destination or transit state's
hazardous waste definition. This could prove extremely difficult for pri-
vate companies to track, especially when there are several states of
transit.134 If the government retains control, it will be better able to reg-
ulate illegal exports and encourage waste reduction measures. Further,
the government will be able to insure that all notice requirements are
being met.
General notification may be provided for "wastes having the same
physical and chemical characteristics" that are shipped regularly to the
same disposer through the same customs offices of the states of export,
import and transit. 135
While the notification provisions require delivery of a fairly compre-
hensive set of information, they allow each country to determine the best
method of implementation. Thus, as in the definition of hazardous
waste, the Convention's notification provisions recognize that one way of
doing things is not always best for all countries concerned.
c. Response to Notification
Parties may decide not to consent, partially or totally, to the import
of hazardous wastes for disposal and may also decide to limit or ban the
export of hazardous wastes or other wastes. 136 Parties must notify the
(14) type of packaging envisaged (eg. bulk, drummed, tanker); (15) estimated quantity in weight/
volume; (16) process by which waste is generated; (17) method of disposal as per Annex III;
(18) declaration by the generator and exporter that the information is correct; (19) information
transmitted to the exporter or generator from the disposer of the waste upon which the latter has
based his assessment that there was no reason to believe that the wastes will not be managed in an
environmentally sound manner in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country of im-
port; and (20) information concerning the contract between the exporter and disposer. Id. at Annex
VA.
134 The Secretariat is required to inform all parties of the information received regarding defini-
tions of hazardous waste under the national legislation of each country, thereby creating a readily
available list for each party to consult. Id. at art. 3(3). Although parties are required to make the
information transmitted to them "available" to their exporters, many private companies may not be
aware of such information. In addition, there is no requirement that the the parties insure that the
information on such lists be understandable to such companies. Id.
135 Id. at art. 6(6).
136 Id. at art. 13(2)(c)(d). Thus, parties who would choose to ban all transfrontier movements of
hazardous wastes may choose to prohibit all exports and imports of hazardous waste.
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Secretariat as to their intentions to be included in such categories.
137
The state of import must "respond to the notifier in writing, con-
senting to the movement with or without conditions, denying permission
for the movement, or requesting additional information be. 138 The state
of export may not allow the generator or exporter 139 to commence ship-
ment until it has received written confirmation that the importing state
has consented to the shipment and has confirmed the existence of a con-
tract between the exporter and the disposer specifying environmentally
sound management of the wastes in question." 4 Parties may not export
hazardous waste to parties which have generally prohibited import or
who do not consent in writing to the specific import.14 1
The state of transit must respond, within sixty days, "consenting to
the movement with or without conditions, denying permission for the
movement, or requiring additional information."' 142 The state of export
may not allow the transfrontier movement to commence until it has re-
ceived the written consent of the state or states of transit. 143 A country
may decide not to require prior written consent to transboundary move-
ment through its boundaries. 1 In this case, if the state of transit fails to
notify the exporting country within sixty days, the state of export may
allow the export to proceed through the state of transit.145 A country
would choose this option if it does not wish to be burdened by the
paperwork that goes along with the transit notification process.
d. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements.
The UNEP Convention imposes annual reporting requirements on
parties. By the end of each calendar year parties must send a report, of
the previous year, containing information on the competent authorities
that have been designated, on the transfrontier movements of hazardous
wastes or other wastes in which they have been involved, and on the
measures adopted by them in implementation of the Convention. 146 In
137 Id. The Secretariat will then provide notice to all parties.
138 Id. at art. 6(2).
139 This distinction recognizes that often the generator contracts with a third party for the actual
exportation of its hazardous waste. There appears to be a growing "shadow industry" that exports
waste from the United States, particularly to developing countries. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4,
at 341.
140 UNEP Convention, supra note 97, at art. 6(3)(a), (b).
141 Id. at art. 4(l)(b), art. 6(3)(a).
142 Id. at art. 6(4).
143 Id. at art. 6(4).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at art. 13(3)(a)-(c). The report is to be transmitted, through the Secretariat, to the Confer-
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addition, parties must report compiled statistics on the effects on human
health and the environment of the generation, transportation and dispo-
sal of hazardous wastes, on bilateral, multilateral and regional agree-
ments entered into, on accidents occurring during transfrontier
movement and disposal and the measures undertaken to deal with them,
on disposal options operated within the area of their national jurisdic-
tion, and on measures undertaken for development of technologies for
the reduction and/or elimination of hazardous waste production. 147 This
provision can, and most likely will, result in the creation and retention of
massive amounts of paperwork, depending on the number of trans-
frontier shipments (notice and acknowledgement must be provided for
every shipment except those that qualify for "general notification") and
the number of countries through which the shipments must pass.
e. Insurance
The notification requirements impose on the exporter a duty to pro-
vide information on relevant insurance requirements and how they are
met by the exporter, carrier and disposer.'48 Although the UNEP Con-
vention does not require insurance on shipments of hazardous waste, it
does seem to provide a mechanism whereby individual parties may re-
quire certain forms of insurance before any shipments occur. Thus, it
appears that any transfrontier movement of hazardous wastes should be
insured or other guarantees provided as required by the state of import
or any state of transit which is a party. Where a party has a national law
or regulation requiring insurance, failure to insure the shipment could
result in a complete ban on the shipment.
f. Liability
The UNEP Convention avoids addressing the difficult issue of liabil-
ity by stating that parties shall adopt, as soon as practicable, rules and
procedures in the "field of liability and compensation for damage result-
ing from the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous
wastes."' 49 While such an open ended provision allows for abuses in the
system, it is unlikely that the Convention would have passed had this
issue not been put off for later discussion. The liability issue, however,
ence of the Parties. Id. at art 13(3). The Conference of the Parties is established under Article 15
and is to be convened by the Executive Director of the UNEP not later than one year after the
UNEP Convention enters into force and thereafter at regular intervals. Id. at art. 15(1).
147 Id. at art. 13(3)(d)-(h).
148 Id. at Annex V A (12).
149 Id. at art. 12.
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must be confronted before the Convention will be able to meet its full
potential.
g. Transfer of Technology
Under the UNEP Convention parties are required to "cooperate
with each other in order to improve and achieve environmentally sound
management of hazardous waste."' 50 In meeting this goal, the Conven-
tion requires parties to make information available which will lead to the
harmonization of technical standards and practices.' In addition, par-
ties are required to cooperate in the transfer of technology and manage-
ment systems relating to the environmentally sound management of
hazardous wastes, and in developing the technical capacity among those
parties needing or requesting such technical assistance.' 52 Parties are
specifically required to "[tlake into account the needs of developing
countries" in cooperating to promote the development of sound manage-
ment policies, the adoption of new low-waste technologies and greater
public awareness. 153 Unfortunately, the Convention leaves the means by
which to effectuate the goal of technology transfer to each country. The
likely result will be an insufficient level of technical assistance provided
by developed countries.
h. General Obligations
Article 4, the general obligations provision, imposes duties on par-
ties with respect to the production, management and movement of haz-
ardous wastes, including the duty to cooperate. This article sets the
UNEP Convention apart from other international acts and makes the
Convention one that will severely restrict the transfrontier movement of
hazardous waste.
Under Article 4, each party is required to take measures to reduce
hazardous waste generation, to ensure the availability of adequate dispo-
sal facilities, and to refuse exportation of hazardous wastes if the party
has reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be managed in
an environmentally sound manner. 154 In addition, information regarding
proposed transboundary movement is required to clearly state the effects
150 Id. at art. 10(1).
151 Id. at art. 10(2)(a).
152 Id. at art. 10(2)(d).
153 Id. at art. 10(4).
154 Id. at art. 4(2)(a),(b),(e). Under the United States' system, federal officials are powerless to
stop even a dangerous export if the host country agrees to accept the shipment. Thus the United
States would be required to change its law in order to adopt the Convention (i.e. amend RCRA).
EPA's Program, supra note 58, at 435.
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the proposed movement may have on human health and the environ-
ment.1 55 Further, each party is required to prevent import if it has rea-
son to believe the wastes in question will not be managed in an
environmentally sound manner.
156
Parties may not permit hazardous wastes or other wastes to be ex-
ported to a non-party or to be imported from a non-party.157 This provi-
sion, in effect, poses a "limited ban" wherein no signatory of the UNEP
Convention may export or import hazardous waste from or to a country
which has not ratified the Convention.' 58 However, parties may enter
into "bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements or arrangements re-
garding transfrontier movement of hazardous waste... with parties or
non-parties provided that such agreements or arrangements do not dero-
gate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes
as required by the UNEP Convention."'
15 9
Additionally, parties are required to "prohibit all persons under its
national jurisdiction from transporting or disposing of hazardous wastes
... unless such persons are authorized to perform such operations."
160
This provision has been taken to mean that companies need a special
permit from their government before they engage in waste transfer or
disposal. Such a governmental authorization system could provide a
check on companies who are left to deal directly with importing and
transit countries. Although the UNEP Convention does not expressly
prohibit hazardous waste shipments that would not be disposed of at a
permitted facility, its language and structure imply this interpretation.
The UNEP Convention provides that when notifying the importing
state's governmental authorities of the impending shipment, the exporter
must provide information on the existence of a contractual agreement
with the waste disposer.
16 1
Each party is also required to ensure that its exported hazardous
wastes are managed in an environmentally sound manner in the states of
import or transit. 162 This provision seems to require not only the state of
export, but also the states of import and transit to take responsibility for
the hazardous waste during its transit. However, the exporting state can-
155 UNEP Convention, supra note 97, at art. 4(2)(f),(g).
156 Id. at art. 4(5).
157 Id.
158 UNEP Transboundary Transport Draft, supra note 111, at 661.
159 UNEP Convention, supra note 97, at art. 11(1). Such arrangements may not stipulate provi-
sions which are less environmentally sound than the provisions in the UNEP Convention.
160 Id. at art. 4(7)(a).
161 Id. at Annex V A(21).
162 Id. at art. 4(8).
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not shift the burden of requiring environmentally sound hazardous waste
management onto the state of import or transit.1 63 It is thus unclear who
should be held liable if the hazardous waste is not managed in an envi-
ronmentally sound manner. It appears, however, that because the states
of export, import, and transit have a responsibility, all such states are
potentially liable.
In addition to the restrictions previously laid out, Article 4 further
restricts transfrontier movements of hazardous waste by requiring that
shipment only be allowed if the state of export does not have the techni-
cal capacity and necessary facilities or suitable disposal sites to dispose of
the wastes in an environmentally sound and efficient manner, the wastes
are required as a raw material for recycling or recovery industries in the
state of import, or the transboundary movement is in accordance with
other criteria to be decided by the parties, provided those criteria do not
differ from the objectives of the UNEP Convention. 164 Given these re-
strictions it is unlikely that much of the hazardous waste movement that
takes place today is acceptable under the UNEP Convention.
This does not mean that transfrontier movements of hazardous
waste will not occur under the Convention. Obviously the UNEP Con-
vention permits hazardous wastes to be imported and exported, even to
developing countries under certain conditions. However, if parties com-
ply with the Convention's provisions it is unlikely that at this time wastes
will be exported to developing countries at present because such coun-
tries are not able to manage such wastes in an environmentally sound
manner.
V. ANALYSIS OF UN-EP CONVENTION AND ITS SURROUNDING
DEBATE
A. Criticism of the UNEP Convention
The main critics of the UNEP Convention are those who want to
see a complete ban on all transfrontier movements of hazardous waste. 165
Environmentalists around the world have argued that the UNEP Con-
vention, rather than prohibiting the transboundary movement of hazard-
ous waste, facilitates waste transfers to developing countries.16 6 Even in
163 Id. at art. 4(10).
164 Id. at art. 4(9)(a)-(c).
165 Several environmental groups including Greenpeace and the Natural Resources Defense
Council have called for a ban on hazardous waste exports. Greenpeace Calls for World Ban, supra
note 7, at 433.
166 Japan to Start Research on Transboundary Movement of Waste, Kyodo News Service, Oct. 6,
1989.
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the United States there has been movement toward such a ban. 167
Those pushing for a ban argue that it would promote waste reduc-
tion and recycling of hazardous wastes168 and that developing countries
lack the economic, political and technological infrastructures to ade-
quately deal with such wastes.' 69 They argue further that under a ban
foreign policy liabilities would not present a serious risk.170 In addition,
the high cost of implementation, bureaucratic expansion and complex
regulatory schemes necessary under the UNEP Convention would all be
avoided under a ban. 17 1 Although those arguing for a ban admit that
prohibiting all transfrontier movements of hazardous waste would put
pressure on waste generators to economically dispose of their waste in
the short run, they argue that governments could alleviate some of this
burden by providing economic incentives for implementing waste reduc-
tion technologies. 172
Some argue that the UNEP Convention in effect imposes a ban on
the transfrontier movement of hazardous waste by providing that a party
cannot export hazardous waste to any country that does not want the
importation or does not have the ability to manage the waste properly.'
73
The argument reasons that such a provision imposes a ban unless a bilat-
eral agreement exists with another country, such as the one between the
United States and Canada. 74 There are, however, distinct differences
between shipments allowed under the UNEP Convention and those al-
lowed under bilateral agreements.
Under the UNEP Convention each shipment requires what could be
deemed a "mini bilateral agreement" that only applies for that one ship-
ment. For example, just because Haiti accepts one shipment of hazard-
167 In 1988 legislation was introduced in the United States that would ban all waste exportation
except where bilateral agreements already exist. H.R. 5018, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). Efforts to
pass such legislation have proven unsuccessful to date.
168 Issues and Policy Considerations, supra note 92, at 391. This argument posits that by forcing
companies in developed countries to meet the stricter and costlier environmental regulations of their
countries, those companies will find it increasingly more attractive to reduce the amount of waste
they generate.
169 This argument posits that since under a ban no developing nation would be receiving hazard-
ous wastes, the lack of economic, political or technological infrastructures presents no problem.
170 Issues and Policy Considerations, supra note 92, at 391. Thus, countries like the United States
would not be projecting a negative image by allowing its companies to endanger the lives of citizens
in developing countries in order to save a few dollars.
171 Id.
172 Note, Legal Incentives for Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach to Hazardous
Waste Management, 95 YALE L.J. 810 (1986).
173 US. Would Tie Waste Exports to Bilateral Agreements, Thomas Says, 11 Int'l Envt. Rep.
(BNA) 472 (Sept. 1988).
174 Id.
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ous waste from the United States does not mean that it will accept
another, or that if it does accept a second shipment, that the second
agreement will be substantially similar to the first agreement. While a
bilateral agreement seems to infer that the countries involved make up
the rules for the shipment, nothing in the UNEP Convention would lead
one to believe that the parties could create their own rules for shipment.
In fact, the UNEP Convention leaves little leeway for countries to di-
verge from its requirements. 175
Others argue that the Convention is a "de facto" prohibition on the
export of hazardous wastes from industrialized to developing coun-
tries.176 Since the exporting country must assure that wastes will be dis-
posed of in a proper manner, and since it is highly unlikely, at this time,
that developing countries have the means to properly dispose of such
wastes, it is unlikely that any such agreement between developing and
industrialized nations could meet this requirement. As explained below,
it is the distinction between a "de facto" ban and a complete ban that
makes the UNEP Convention the best means to regulate the trans-
frontier movements of hazardous waste to date.
B. Arguments Against a Ban
Several arguments can be made against a complete ban on trans-
frontier movements of hazardous wastes. First, much is made of the fact
that developed countries dump unwanted waste on developing countries,
but evidence exists that some developing countries do not favor a com-
plete ban.177 Developing nations are not completely against importing
hazardous wastes into their territory since they earn badly needed cash
from such dealings. 178 Recent events, however, have convinced them
that "they need help in policing the shipment of wastes, either through
the transfer of technology to help them evaluate it, or through the use of
some kind of policing mechanism." 179 In fact, despite the recent scan-
dals regarding the dumping of hazardous wastes in developing countries,
some African nations continue to make arrangements to dispose of for-
eign waste.180 Imposing a complete ban would be engaging in a form of
paternalism.
Second, some countries may run out of space in which to dispose of
175 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
176 World Toxic Pact Backed, 222 ENGINEERING NEWS REC. 13 (1989).
177 Waste Shipment Incidents, supra note 106, at 471.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Helmore, supra note 9, at 8, col 1.
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their hazardous waste. According to the EPA, within the next decade
more than half of the states in the United States will be unable to accept
hazardous waste due to a lack of land fill capacity."'1 Thus, it is highly
likely that in the near future landfills will no longer be available in the
United States and Europe. It will then become necessary for companies
to enter into legally regulated export agreements with other countries.
Third, the most environmentally sound disposal sites are often
found in another country.182 Where companies lack environmentally ac-
ceptable sites for waste disposal at home a complete ban on export is
undesirable.18 ' For example, in order to improve their lifestyles and
their position in the world economy, many developing countries have
actively encouraged industrial development.18 4 These countries feel that
a total ban is unrealistic, in part, because as they industrialize they will
produces waste which they will be unable to dispose of themselves.18 5
Since developing nations often lack facilities to dispose of their own haz-
ardous waste, a ban on all exports could ironically harm those it pro-
fesses to protect.
Fourth, and closely related to the last argument, is that as the
United States and European companies find themselves facing increas-
ingly high disposal costs at home and unable to export industrial waste to
other countries, they will consider opening plants in developing countries
where disposal laws will remain lax.18 6 While this will likely lower the
disposal costs of these companies, it leaves the developing countries with
the problems of having hazardous waste disposed of in their territory. In
addition, it is unlikely that these developing countries will be compen-
sated for such disposal.
Fifth, a ban overlooks the possibility of developing countries actu-
ally creating a hazardous waste disposal industry. If done properly this
could prove very profitable for them in the long-run. In fact, several
181 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 341.
182 In fact, a neighboring country may contain the nearest disposal site or another country may
offer superior disposal technology. OECD, supra note 15, at 7-16.
183 This argument applies not only to developing countries, but also to many smaller European
countries unable to dispose of the hazardous wastes they generate. Handley, supra note 10, at 10171.
These countries may not be able to afford to build special disposal facilities or geological factors,
such as the Netherlands' high water table, may prevent such disposal. Id.
184 Comment, Hazardous Substances in Developing Countries" Who Should Regulate Foreign Cor-
porations?, 6 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 143, 147 (1986). See also Barnes, supra note 1, at 392.
185 Bollag, supra note 30, at 45.
186 Companies have strong economic incentive to relocate to countries with the lowest production
costs. In addition, the United States has exercised little control over manufacturing companies
which have relocated plants to developing countries. Comment, Any Place But Here: A Critique of
United States Hazardous Export Policy, 7 BROOK. J. OF INT'L L. 350 (1981).
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plans to develop such an industry are already in progress. For example,
Zatec Services, a Netherlands company, plans to ship industrial waste to
three African nations where a British contractor is building landills. 187
In addition, two United States companies have proposed to build inciner-
ators in the South Pacific to process waste generated in the United
States. 188 Peru is also considering building the developing countries' first
incinerator to handle industrial hazardous waste.189 In contrast to a ban,
many developing countries want a technology transfer mechanism that
will enable them to obtain the necessary technology from developed
countries to build their own disposal plants. 190 The situation was best
summed up by Indira Ghandi at the 1972 United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment in Stockholm:
The rich countries may look upon development as the cause of environmen-
tal destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of improving the
environment of living, of providing food, water, sanitation and shelter, of
making the deserts green and the mountains habitable .... When [the peo-
ple] themselves feel deprived how can we urge the preservation of animals?
How can we speak to those who live in villages and slums about keeping the
oceans, rivers and the air clean when their own lives are contaminated at
the source? 'Environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty.
Nor can poverty be eradicated without the use of science and
technology. 191
Sixth, many of those who argue for a ban claim that a receiving
country's "informed consent" is a sham as far as developing countries are
concerned because they lack the scientific and institutional framework to
develop comprehensive policies on hazardous waste management.
192
This argument fails to recognize that by banning all hazardous waste,
developing countries may be given a false sense of security that will cause
them to fail to develop an understanding of the problem of hazardous
waste disposal and ways in which to deal with it. If in banning all haz-
ardous waste exports it could also be guaranteed that developing coun-
tries would never have to deal with hazardous wastes, a ban would be
effective. Such a guarantee is unlikely, however, because, as mentioned
above, developing countries will develop their own industries, will have
to deal with multinational companies locating within their borders to
187 Helmore, supra note 9, at 8, col. 2.
188 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 344.
189 Millman, supra note 20, at 6.
190 Developed, Developing Countries Disagree, supra note 115, at 376.
191 See Anand, Development and EnvironmenL The Case of the Developing Countries, 20 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 1 (1980).
192 Handley, supra note 10, at 10182.
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take advantage of their lax legal provisions and illegal dumping will
continue.
Finally, a ban will, in all probability, lead to an increase in the
amount of illegal dumping that occurs. 193 Since a ban itself does nothing
to reduce disposal costs, and most likely raises them, more and more
companies may find themselves faced with the decision of going out of
business or dumping their hazardous wastes illegally. Further, members
of developing countries will continue to find it profitable to take on such
wastes. If developing countries remain unprepared to deal with hazard-
ous wastes, we are likely to see a sharp increase in environmental
disasters.
C. Solutions
Although none of the existing legal provisions controlling the trans-
frontier movement of hazardous waste addresses the root of the problem,
namely the economic force that drives hazardous waste export,19 4 the
UNEP Convention goes further as a international legal device than do
the other regulatory measures or would a complete ban on such exports.
The problem with the OECD and EC provisions, as well as with the
United States' regulations is that they do not come close to providing a
"level playing field" among the world's nations.195
The goal of a "level playing field" for international shipping require-
ments would be more closely met under both the UNEP Convention and
a complete ban on all hazardous waste exports.196 Neither, however, ad-
dresses the problem of divergent hazardous waste management laws
among the world's nations. 197 It seems unlikely that any international
regulation is capable of directly "leveling the playing field" in this way.
Because the UNEP Convention allows for the possibility of hazard-
ous waste export (at least in theory) it provides an incentive for develop-
ing nations to advance their environmental regulations, and thus goes
further than a complete ban in attempting to even out the world's diver-
gent hazardous waste management regulations. The result will be a more
equitable world in the long-run.
193 Although illegal dumping will continue to exist under the UNEP Convention, by providing
legal means of export the Convention lessens the incentive to take this route.
194 Porterfield & Weir, supra note 4, at 344.
195 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Such regulations only bind a small number of coun-
tries and are not adequately enforced. Further, none deal with the needs of developing countries.
196 This assumes that each would bind a substantial number of countries, thus evening out the
regulations on hazardous waste export.
197 While the laws governing export would be the same, laws governing disposal within a country
would remain vastly different.
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A complete ban is directed toward the goal of overall waste reduc-
tion. While this goal is not to be taken lightly (in fact it is one of the
goals of the UNEP Convention), a policy favoring waste reduction will
not necessarily reduce risks nor make it clear which risks we choose to
live with.198 Further, because implementation of the UNEP Convention
encourages developing countries to adopt stricter internal regulations re-
garding hazardous wast, it should eventually make it as costly to dispose
of waste abroad as at home. Thus, companies will turn to waste reduc-
tion as a means of cost reduction. A ban, by emphasizing symbolic,
short-run solutions, makes it unreasonable to expect changes in the na-
ture of hazardous waste policy in developing countries and thus the in-
centive to dispose of hazardous wastes illegally will remain.
Because the problem of transfrontier movement of hazardous waste
is mainly an informational and an economic one, those who argue for a
ban may be better off directing their efforts at drafting legislation that
would provide industry with incentives to reduce waste production and
to undertake proper disposal methods. This could be accomplished
through a system in which industry receives money or tax breaks if it can
show implementation of waste reduction technology and proof of compli-
ance with legal disposal methods.199 Such a plan would change the cost
considerations which currently make foreign disposal attractive.200 In
addition, developed countries could encourage the transfer of technology
and information to developing countries by providing consultants to
work with the national leaders of developing nations.
It has been argued that an efficient and coherent system of control of
transfrontier movements of hazardous waste should neither create barri-
ers to nor affect competition.2"' While the UNEP Convention will affect
the competitiveness of private companies by making it harder and more
costly for them to export their hazardous waste in the short-run, the
Convention, if it accomplishes all it sets out to do, will be more beneficial
in the long-run than will a complete ban on all hazardous waste export.
In addition, the Convention will make it equally more difficult and costly
for all companies located in the countries which are parties to the UNEP
Convention to dispose of their hazardous waste.
At this time it is difficult to predict the Convention's effectiveness,
198 Issues and Policy Considerations, supra note 92, at 227. One illegal shipment could cause
more harm than thousands of regulated shipments.
199 Russell, Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazardous Waste, 13 COLUM. J. ENVr'L
L. 257, 265 (1988) (discussing hazardous waste disposal within the United States).
200 Id. at 266.
201 Council Directive of Dec. 6, 1984 on the Supervision and Control Within the European Commu-
nity of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste (84/631/EEC) No. L. 326/31.
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because it is unclear how many (and which) countries it will bind. Cur-
rently, the Convention is open for signature by states and political and/
or economic integration organizations, 2" with an interim secretariat
overseeing its implementation prior to ratification.2"3 The UNEP Con-
vention is, however, likely to become the most binding international
agreement dealing with the transfrontier movement of hazardous wastes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goal of a "level playing field" addresses the economic and legal
problems behind the transfrontier movement of hazardous wastes. Only
when individual nations have substantially similar regulations governing
the management of hazardous wastes will we find not only that private
companies no longer have incentives to export their hazardous waste to
developing nations, but also that such companies will not suffer economic
harm by complying with strict environmental regulations at home.
As developed nations began to pass tougher environmental regula-
tions regarding hazardous waste management, companies found it in-
creasingly more costly to comply with such regulations and thus sought
cheaper disposal alternatives. While regulations within developed na-
tions, such as the United States, have attempted to control the problem
of hazardous waste export, their effectiveness has been questionable given
the ambiguous quality of many provisions and the difficulty of enforcing
them. Likewise, the EC and OECD attempts at international regulations
have not proven any more successful, in part, because member nations
have not implemented the regulations and because enforcement provi-
sions have been weak.
A ban on all exports of hazardous waste addresses neither the eco-
nomic or legal causes of the hazardous waste problem. Under a complete
ban, companies in developed nations would still face higher disposal
costs than companies located in countries with less strict environmental
regulations. In addition, the legal regulations among the world's nations
will remain divergent. Although the ban would encourage a reduction in
the generation of hazardous wastes, it is unlikely that a ban would go as
far in protecting the interests of developing nations as would a provision
that encouraged these developing nations to advance their legal and tech-
nical standards governing hazardous waste management. Further, once
the disposal regulations of developing nations are as strict as those of
developed countries, companies will no longer have an economic incen-
202 UNEP Convention, supra note 97, at art. 21.
203 UNEP Member Appointed to Assist Waste Control Convention Secretariat, 12 Int'l Env't Rep
(BNA) 607 (Dec. 13, 1989).
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tive to export their wastes. At such time, the most'viable cost reduction
method will be to reduce the quantity of hazardous wastes produced.
The UNEP Convention will go the furthest in "leveling the global
playing field." Because the Convention permits the transfrontier ship-
ment of hazardous wastes under certain conditions it encourages devel-
oping nations to implement regulations governing such wastes. In
addition, the UNEP Convention requires developed nations to assist de-
veloping countries in obtaining technology advances relating to such
wastes. In the meantime, the UNEP Convention prevents the shipment
of hazardous wastes to any nation which does not want the waste or
cannot dispose of it properly. Thus, the UNEP Convention better pro-
tects the interests of developing nations both now and in the future.
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